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ARGUMENT
A.

THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT FAILED
TO FOLLOW ITS DUTY TO EXCUSE MR. TAYLOR FOR CAUSE BASED ON HIS
IMPLIED AND ACTUAL BIAS, THEREBY DEPRIVING MR. MULFORD OF HIS
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO A TRIAL BY AN IMPARTIAL JURY.
1.

The District Court had a duty, which it failed to uphold, to excuse Presiding
Juror Taylor for implied bias based on consanguinity.

Union Pacific does not dispute that the U.S. Constitution, Amendment VII, and the
Constitution of the state ofIdaho, Article I, §7, both grant the parties to a ci viI suit the right to a trial
by an impartial jury. Further, pursuant to Article I, § 7, the right to trial by jury "shall remain
inviolate." Additionally, Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 38(a), provides the parties to a civil suit the
right to ajury trial. A pmiy's "inviolate" right to an impartial jury is achieved by excusing for cause
any juror admitting to or harboring implied and/or actual bias. Idaho Code §§ 19-2019 and 192020( 1) I and Idaho Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(2) and (7) exist to preserve and provide
a party's the right to an impartial jury.
While UP asserts Mr. Mulford waived the consanguinity challenge, the District Court's
mandatory duty to excuse Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor. The District Court's duty cannot be waived.
"[T]be primary responsibility for voir dire and the selection of competent jurors rests upon the trial
judge." Quincy v. Jt. School Dist. No. 41, Benewah County, 102 Idaho 764, 770, 640 P.2d 304, 308

UP incolTectly asserts that 1. C. §§ 19-2019 and 19-2020( 1) only apply to criminal proceedings. Brief
of Respondent, p. 4, fn.2. However, this is belied by Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(1) which
provides that challenges for cause are based on "[aJ want of any ofthe qualifications prescribed by
the Idaho Code to render a person competent as ajuror." This includes the aforementioned statutes,
as well as § 19-2018, discussed further in the remainder of this brief.
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(1981).2
The record unequivocally establishes, and it is not puzzling or difficult to see that Presiding
Juror Lorin Taylor held consanguinity with UP, such that the District Court was required, by §§ 192019 and 19-2020, and Rule 47(h)(2) to excuse him for cause. While Union Pacific is a corporation,
a corporation is a "person." See Idaho Code 30-1-140(32)('''Person''' includes individual and
entity" in the definition of a corporation).

See also, Citizens United v. Federal Election

Commission, 130 S. Ct. 876,900 (2010). UP does not dispute Mr. Taylor's father was employed

by UP. Tr., p. 61, 1l.12-25. Mr. Taylor's grandfathers, three uncles and a brother were members of
UP. Tr., p. 112,11. 6-15. 3 This certainly qualifies as consanguinity underIdaho Code § 19-2020(1),
and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47(h)(2), such that the District Court was required to excuse Mr.

UP contends Mr. Mulford waived his right to challenge Presiding Juror Taylor based on
consanguinity, citing to Morris v. Thomson, 130 Idaho 138, 937 P.2d 1212 (1997). That case is
distinguishable, as there the issue as to the cause challenges were based on the jurors' business
relationship with the defendant, as well as jurors, who ended up being excused by the trial court
due to their or their family members' being patients of the defendant doctor. Id., at 141, 937
P.2d at 1215[emphasis supplied].
UP asserts the lack of the identity of the "potential juror" precludes appropriate evaluation by this
Court on appeal, related to Mr. Taylor's brother, grandfather and three uncles working for UP. Brief
ofRespondent, p. 3, fn.1. Therein lies a "Catch-22" based on the District Court's failure to preserve
and create an accurate and proper record, which UP does not dispute. Again, it is the trial court's
"primary responsibility" to select competent jurors. See, State v. Merrffield, 109 Idaho 11, 16, 704
P.2d 343,348 (CL App. 1985)(citing, Quincy v. Jt. School Dist. No. 41, supra, 102 Idaho 764, 640
P.2d 304 (1982)). It follows that in selecting competent jurors, the trial court must create an
accurate record, which the district court did not do here in failing to have Mr. Taylor identify
himself when providing further information as to his consanguinity with UP.
Al'PELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 2

Taylor for cause. "[R]esolving doubt in favor of retaining a juror can result in deprivation ofa fair
trial." State v. Hauser, 143 Idaho 603,610,150 P.3d 296,304 (Ct. App. 2006). Based on Mr.
Taylor's implied bias from consanguinity with UP, the remedy was simple: excuse Mr. Taylor and
replace him with an impartial juror, free of implied bias.
Moreover, excusing Mr. Taylor was mandatory, the as it would be if he were a convicted
felon or a person having a debtor-creditor relationship. A convicted felon cannot serve on a jury,
as proscribed by Idaho Code § 19-20 lS( 1). Further, a juror with a debtor-creditor relationship with
one of the parties to the case cannot sit on the jury, as prohibited by I.e. § 19-2020 (2) and Rule
47(h)(3).

Likewise, the District Court was required to excuse Mr. Taylor based on his

consanguinity with UP.

The District Court's failure violated Mr. Mulford's "inviolate"

constitutional right to having a fair trial decided by an impartial jury. Further, the District Court's
failure was an abuse of its discretion and reversible error.
2.

The record unequivocally shows Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor held actual bias
against Mr. Mulford and the District Court abused its discretion and committed
reversible error in refusing to excuse him for actual bias.

In addition to the District Court's failure to comply with its duty to excuse Mr. Taylor for
his implied bias, it also committed reversible error in failing to excuse Mr. Taylor for actual bias.
UP admits 4 that Mr. Taylor admitted, based on his "personal opinion," that he could and would not
award any damages for pain and suffering, as he "(did not] believe that pain and suffering should

4

Brief of Respondent, p.6-S.
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be entered for compensation." Tr., p. 87, 1.8-p. 90, 1.2. This qualified as actual bias under Idaho
Code § 19-2019(2) and Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 47 (h )(7).
UP improperly characterizes the District Court's error as rehabilitating Presiding Juror
Taylor. The flaw of UP's characterization is self-evident from the following colloquy:
POTENTIAL JUROR # 29: Lorin Taylor, juror 29.
THE COURT: Thank you.
[LORIN TAYLOR]: It's more personal opinion that I do believe that if
somebody's going to be covered for lost wages, compensation, hospital bills
and stufflike that, why further it for pain and suffering? I was injured on the
workforce too. I didn't get any lawsuit. I didn't get any money. And that's
okay, because there's programs out there for everything. And, you know, I
got my lost wages, but I didn't get any pain and suffering. But the hospital
bills were paid.
MR. LARSEN: So in this case for an item of damage of pain and suffering
could you follow the law? And if the law, in fact, supports that Mr. Mulford
is entitled to money damages for pain and suffering, could you award that
given your experience?
[MR. TAYLOR]: I believe that I can be fair on both sides. Pain and
suffering is one thing, but if he still gets lost wages, retirement, and
hospital bills covered, that's a lot of pain and suffering in itself right
there.
MR. LARSEN: They're separate damages. And that's why I asked this,
because I want to make sure that you're going be (sic) fair on every
aspect of this. And if there's a certain aspect of damage that you just say
I don't believe in it, cowboy up and move on, I want to know that. That
would be an indication that you may not be able to follow the judge's
instructions.
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Okay. Yeah. I don't believe that pain and suffering
should be entered for compensation.
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MR. LARSEN: All right. I'd move for excusing for cause, Your Honor.
MR. DENSELY: Your Honor, may we approach.
THE COURT: Just a second. Let me ask a question. Mr. Taylor, in this
particular case, the judge dictates or tells the jury what the law in Idaho is,
what the duties are, what the responsibilities ofthe parties are to each other,
and what the damages are that can be awarded ifthe evidence suppOlis it. If
I were to instruct you that certain items of damages are compensable and you
believe that the evidence supported those items of damage, would you follow
my instructions and award the damages that you think the evidence would
support?
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yes.
THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. You may proceed.
MR. LARSEN: And that would include an item for pain and suffering?
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Okay. Like I said, just personal opinion soTr., p. 87, 1.8-p. 90,1.2 [Emphasis supplied]. Despite Mr. Taylor's repeated admissions he could not
be impmiial, the District Court informed Mr. Taylor that he was to follow its instructions. fd. The
District Court made Mr. Taylor a liar, and its lecture to him did not change his biased stripes-that
is, his strong, and admitted, personal beliefs that plaintiffs, which included Mr. Mulford, should
not get pain and suffering damages.
UP posited that Mr. Mulford waived his challenge to excuse Mr. Taylor for cause due to
actual bias. The previously cited colloquy unequivocally belies this faulty position. Mr. Mulford
made the aforementioned objection to Mr. Taylor. UP's position would require Mr. Mulford to
object over and over again, and tell the District Court that it is wrong, to avoid waiver, which is not
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the law. There record clearly establishes Mr. Mulford adequately made and preserved his objection
to Mr. Taylor for his actual bias. Tr., p. 89,11.5-6.
Also, UP contends Mr. Mulford was required to exhaust his peremptory challenges, and was
prejudiced by being required to use such a challenge to remove the juror citing to Nightengale v.
Timmel, 151 Idaho 345, 256 P.3d 755 (2011) and State v. Ramos, 119 Idaho 568, 808 P.2d 1313

(1991). However, in both of those cases, the juror the parties challenged for cause did not sit or
deliberate on the jury. Nightengale, 151 Idaho at 353,256 P.3d at 763; Ramos, 119 Idaho at 569,
808 P.2d at 1314. Here, not only did Mr. Taylor with his implied and actual bias sit on the jury, he
was the presiding foreperson who not only decided the case but was the chosen leader to present the
jury's verdict.
Additionally, UP's position has little credence, since UP does not give any response to this
Court's holding that a party should not be forced to exercise a peremptory challenge to excuse a
potential juror who is disqualified for cause. Stoddard v. Nelson, 99 Idaho 293, 296,581 P.2d 339,
342 (1978). As this Court stated:
[AJ litigant should not be forced to exercise a peremptory challenge to
exclude the prospective juror when it clearly appears that (the prospective
juror) is disqualified for cause.
!d. Stoddard is still good law. More importantly, the District Court had the simple remedy
of excusing Mr. Taylor and selecting an impartial juror to replace him. However, as is evident from
the record, the District COUli ignored this simple remedy and chose to allow Mr. Taylor to remain
on the jury. Once again, the District Court failed to follow its mandatory, statutory duty to select
AI'PELLANT'S REPLY BRIEF - PAGE 6

an impartial jury, deprived Mr. Mulford of his right to an impartial jury, abused its discretion and
committed reversible error. Mr. Mulford is entitled to this Court remanding the case back to the
District Court for a new trial.
B.

AS MR. MULFORD DID NOT OPEN THE DOOR REGARDING HIS RRB
BENEFITS, THE DISTRICT COURT COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR
IN ALLOWING SUCH EVIDENCE TO GO TO THE JURY.

There is no legitimate dispute that Mr. Mulford's RRB benefits are a collateral source. s
There is also no legitimate dispute that Mr. Mulford filed motions in limine precluding such
evidence to go to the jury. Mr. Mulford did not open the door to allow UP to improperly question
him about the collateral source evidence.
1.

The District Court initially held RRB benefits were a collateral source.

UP asserts the District Court reserved ruling on the issue of whether evidence of Mr.
Mulford's RRB benefits, which are a collateral source, should go to the jury. Initially, the District
Court decided such evidence was not admissible. Prior to trial, Mr. Mulford moved in limine to
prevent UP from introducing evidence of his receiving RRB benefits. R., Vol. I, pp. 20-178. Mr.
Mulford asserted that RRB benefits were a "collateral source" and inadmissible at trial. During trial,
after the District Court allowed UP to improperly question Mr. Mulford about his RRB benefits, the

UP would not concede Mr. Mulford's RRB benefits are a collateral source, arguing, once again, out
of proper context, that such benefits are "funded by a substantial contribution of the employer."
Brief of Respondent, p. 21, fn.5. Aside from the fact that this is no where in the record, what UP
fails to state in proper context is that it does not entirely fund those benefits. It further misrepresents
the fact that Mr. Mulford funds his RRB benefits through substantial contributions from his own
pay.
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District Court stated it would not have allowed RRB benefits evidence to go to the jury. The District
Court stated:

And in my view from the outset, the RRB was a collateral source .
Clearly collateral source evidence is almost never admissible and
shouldn't have been in this case, and I've made that ruling in the
motions in limine for that specific reason.
Tr., p. 323, 11.1-7 [emphasis supplied]. Once again, UP submitted an incorrect position to
this Court.

2.

Mr. Mulford did not open the door to RRB benefits.

Mr. Mulford's testimony at trial did not raise the issue of RRB benefits, as is self-evident
from his testimony:
Q. [BY MR. GABIOLA] Have you looked for any other employment?
A. I've looked for a lot of part-time work, because I would like to get into
finding out how I would be able to work or if I could even work. So I've
applied at a lot of auto parts stores, Convergys, Sears. I can't remember
everything but-Home Depot.
Tr., p. 201, 1.17 -po 202, 1.1. Also, again, Mr. Mulford testified to this to respond to UP's mitigation
defense. It stretches the imagination as to how this opened the door to his RRB benefits, since, as
is clear, he never stated that he was poor, facing financial difficulties or malingering, which the
subsequent cases held opened the door.
In support of its position, UP cites to Mr. Mulford's discovery deposition in a meager attempt
to claim Mr. Mulford's trial testimony was inconsistent with his deposition testimony. UP does not
posit to the Court the proper context as to Mr. Mulford's deposition testimony. In Mr. Mulford's
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deposition testimony, UP questioned Mr. Mulford as to his RRB benefits, over objection by Mr.
Mulford's counsel. To those questions, Mr. Mulford's counsel stated the following objection:

And I'm going to object to the form of the question as it calls for
collateral source information. But you can answer.
R., Vol. I, pp. 94-95 [emphasis supplied]. Also, UP does not put the entire context in its questioning
ofMr. Mulford in his deposition, as to whether Mr. Mulford had testified whether he could go back
to work or what kinds ofjobs he could do. The following colloquy puts the matter in proper context:
Q. [By Mr. Densley] Okay. So what kind of jobs do you think that you can
do now?

A. I don't know. I could probably be a lube technician and maybe work on
a farm.
Q. Did you say "a farm"?

A. Uh-huh.
Q. As a mechanic?

A. Probably. I don't know.
R., Vol. 1., p. 95 (Mulford deposition, p. 58, 11.17-24). And, UP's attempt to state that it was
impeaching Mr. Mulford because he testified he did not know ifhe could do the jobs, would and
should have been limited to his deposition testimony on that issue. It did not include his testimony
for RRB benefits.
Furthermore, UP incorrectly asserts that the only objection Mr. Mulford's counsel made to
this evidence at trial was on the basis of relevance and asked an answered. To the contrary, his
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counsel reminded the District Court prior to its allowance ofRRB benefits evidence, that UP's
questions, "raise[ d] an issue that we addressed in our motions in limine." Tr., p. 250, 11.23-25. In
his motions in limine, Mr. Mulford asserted, in addition to the fact his RRB benefits were a
collateral source, that such evidence was inadmissible as being more prejudicial than probative
under I.R.E. 403. R., Vol. I, pp.l85-86
As to UP's argument that the District Court offered to strike the testimony or give a
cautionary instruction, this is little consolation, and unrealistic, since the horse had left the barn.
The damage had already been done, and no instruction by the District Court could or would have
cured the damaging, prejudicial effect evidence of the RRB benefits had on the jury. This is
especially true, again, since Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor, with his consanguinity with UP, and his
obvious knowledge as to how the RRB system worked. Mr. Taylor testified about this during voir
dire when questioned by the Court. and UP's counsel:
THE COURT: Do you have any kind of relationship with the parties such as
Employer/employee, debtor/creditor, attorney/client, master/servant, that
kind of relationship?

***
POTENTIAL JUROR #29[Lorin Taylor]: Yes.
THE COURT: Tell me what your relationship is.
[LORIN TAYLOR]: My father's an employee of Union Pacific.
THE COURT: Your father's an employee of the railroad. All right.
And so you don't have that relationship. Your father does.
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yes.
Tr., p. 61,1.12-25. Mr. Taylor further reiterated his knowledge of retirement and his dad:
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MR. DENSLEY: All right. Who was the next one? Yes, sir.
[LORIN TAYLOR]: My mother slipped and fell on some ice and tore her
memscus
and had surgery. My dad's been at the railroad for 35 years, getting ready
to take retirement and had to replace both of his knees just due to hard work
and old age.
MR. DENSLEY: And what was his craft on the railroad?
[LORIN TAYLOR]: He worked for a machinist gang for a long time, and
now he's a foreman.
MR. DENSLEY: So is he still working for the railroad?
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yeah. He'll take full retirement at the end of July.
MR. DENSLEY: Did you say he had double knee replacements?
[LORIN TAYLOR]: He has to get them. He's just going to wait until he's
retired.
MR. DENSLEY: Oh, I see. So that's something that he's going to get
eventually but he's going to wait until retirement.
[LORIN TAYLOR]: Yeah, but it's not injury related. It's just due to wear
and tear.
Tr., p.I 06, l.16-p. 107, l.IS[ emphasis supplied]. It does not take a rocket scientist to figure out
Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor was well versed in and knew full well about RRB benefits.
3.

The District Court abused its discretion in admitting the RRB benefits.

UP contends that Mr. Mulford's substantial rights were not affected by the District Court's
admission of the RRB benefits. If the improper admission of collateral source evidence were not
a substantial right, the state of Idaho would not have enacted Idaho Code §6-1606. Further, the
federal courts would not have held it was reversible error to allow the admission ofRRB benefits,
which are a collateral source. See, Eichel v. New York Central Railroad, 375 U.S. 253,255 (1963).
In Eichel, like in this case, the railroad sought to introduce evidence at trial that the plaintiff received
disability benefits under the Railroad Retirement Act for the purpose of impeaching plaintiff's
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testimony regarding his alleged motivation in not returning to work. Eichel 3 75 U.S. at 253-54. The
U.S. Supreme Court held that the collateral source rule bars evidence of benefits and payments
received by injured railroad employees from sources independent of their railroad employers,
because the prejudicial effect of such evidence and its potential for jury misuse far outweighs
its probative value. Id. at 255 [emphasis supplied]; See also Tipton v. Socony Mobile OUInc., 375
U.S. 34, 37 (1963); Sheehy v. Southern Pacffic Transportation Co., 631 F.2d 649, 652 (9th Cir.
1980); Green v. Denver and Rio Grand Western Railway Co., 59 F.3d 1029, 1032 (lOth Cir. 1995).

Moreover, in Green, supra, the Tenth Circuit held the trial court committed reversible error because
"Eichel compels the conclusion that the collateral source rule prohibits admission ofRRA disability

benefits in a FELA case." !d., 59 F.3d at 1032-33. Further, the court in Green held that "public
policy favors giving the plaintiff a double recovery rather than allowing a wrongdoer to enjoy
reduced liability simply because the plaintiff received compensation from an independent source."
Id.

Moreover, the District Court deprived Mr. Mulford of his constitutional right to a fair trial
by an impartial jury. The admission ofRRB benefits, combined with the obvious consanguinity and
knowledge Presiding Juror Taylor held with UP and RRB benefits, deprived Mr. Mulford of having
his case decided by an impartial jury. This is further bolstered by Presiding Juror Lorin Taylor's
personal and actual bias of not awarding pain and suffering. The simple truth remains: Mr. Mulford
did not get a fair trial because the District Court failed to comply with the statutes and rules in not
excusing Mr. Taylor, which was further compounded by its improper and erroneous decision to
admit evidence ofMr. Mulford's RRB benefits.
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4.

Mr. Mulford never testified as to his RRB benefits and did not raise any issue
to open the door to that evidence.

UP gives a lengthy discussion and citation to its tenuous position Mr. Mulford opened the
door. All of the cases it cites to are patently distinguishable and inapposite to this case. The
plaintiffs in those cases claimed emotional injw)l due to financial stress, lack of insurance,
malingering or inability to pay bills an issue thereby opening the door. This was admitted to by UP

in its brief and citation to its cases. 6 See, Crowther v. Consolidated Rail Corp., 680 F.3d 95, 100
(1 st Cif. 2012)(evidence of malingering); Moore v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 825 S.W.2d 839, 842-43
(Mo. 1992)(plaintifftestified he could not afford physical therapy); Moses v. Union Pac. R.R. Co.,
64 F.3d 413, 416 (8 th Cir. 1995); Lange v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 703 F.2d 322, 323-4 (8 th Cir.
I 983)(plaintiff testified he had no savings or disability income to support his family while off

work); Gladden v. P. Henderson & Co., 385 F.2d 480, 482 (3rd Cir. 1967)(plaintifftestified he got
behind on his bills while off work)). In this matter, it is self-evident that Mr. Mulford did not
testify he was suffering financial distress, lacked insurance, could not pay his bills or that he was
malingering, unlike the plaintiffs in the cases cited by UP. Mr. Mulford simply testified he wanted
to see ifhe could get back to work or ifhe could work, that was it. It in no way opened the door to
RRB benefits.

Mr. Mulford simply testified in opposition to UP's mitigation defense, which it

asselied, that Mr. Mulford had to look for other work to mitigate his damages.

6Brief of Respondent, pp. 23-26.
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Certainly, the fact that the jury had evidence of Mr. Mulford's RRB benefits wrongfully
prejudiced the jury against Mr. Mulford. Additionally, Mr. Taylor's consanguinity with UP, his
background knowledge of RRB benefits, and his actual bias against awarding pain and suffering,
combined with evidence that Mr. Mulford was receiving RRB benefits, further prejudiced the jury
against Mr. Mulford. This in turn resulted in the jury returning a verdict in favor of UP against Mr.
Mulford. Under these circumstances, Mr. Mulford did not receive a fair trial and the matter should
be remanded for him to receive a new one.

C.

UNION PACIFIC WAIVED ITS RIGHT TO FEES AND COSTS ON APPEAL.

UP did not request, nor has it sought, attorney's fees or costs on appeal. Moreover, UP did
not argue or cite to any statute or rule as to attorney's fees and costs on appeal. It is axiomatic that
a party requesting fees must submit the statutory basis for requesting fees. Michalk v. Michalk, 148
Idaho 224, 235, 220 P.3d 580, 591 (2009); Farnworth v. Ratliff, 134 Idaho 237, 999 P.2d 892

(2000); Gilman v. Davis, 138 Idaho 599, 67 P.3d 78 (2003). Moreover, a party waives his issues
or arguments on appeal, when such are not supported by legal authority or the record.

Bach v.

Bagley, 148 Idaho 784, 229 P.3d 1146 (2010). UP waived its right to seek or request attorney's fees
and costs.

D.

MR. MULFORD IS ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS ON
APPEAL.

Mr. Mulford is entitled to attorney's fees and costs under Idaho Code § 12-121 and Idaho
Appellate Rules 40 and41. Idaho Code § 12-121 andLA.R. 41 allow for the award ofattorney's fees
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and costs in a civil action where a matter was defended frivolously, unreasonably and without
foundation. LA.R. 40 allows for the award of costs to the prevailing party on appeal.
Mr. Mulford submits that the District Court's errors in failing to excuse Mr. Taylor as a juror
for cause, combined with its en"oneous admission ofRRB benefits deprived Mr. Mulford of his right
to trial by an impartial jury. The District Court's failure to uphold and conform with its statutory
duty to excuse Mr. Taylor is reversible error. This certainly makes UP's position unreasonable and
without foundation. For these reasons, Mr. Mulford is entitled to attorney's fees and costs on
appeal.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, Mr. Mulford respectfully requests that the Court remand the case
back to the District Court for a new trial.
DATED this

~day of April, 2013.
COOPER & LARSEN, CHARTERED

By--f-7j/~lk~~
,,;;;7'_ _
~N
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